OverviewReduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) is a global strategy to alleviate climate change and improve the world. This paper analyses a REDD+ pilot in Kilosa, Tanzania – led by local conservation groups Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) and Community Forest Conservation Network of Tanzania. These two groups are also in partnership with one another to create the project ‘Making REDD Work or Communities and Forest Conservation in Tanzania’ – The REDD + pilot in Kilosa is also a part of this project. The paper documents how governance functions to make changes in order to create a tradable commodity under the project. Input and output legitimacy is explored in the paper as long as acceptability of locals. Legitimacy is defined by acceptability for the decision by those who would be directly affected and involved by the results. The data in this study is made from 5 out of 13 villages involved in the Kilosa REDD+ pilot. Important elements from REDD+ include organisational and institutional changes such as defining property rights to forests, establishing management systems to monitor leakage and control, organisational trading, validation and verification under international standards and payment systems. Payments in Tanzania are vulnerable to elite capture. Input and output legitimacy – An effort is made for locals to participate in REDD+ institutional changes and planning, but elites may shape perceptions and preferences. The program may forcefully change livelihoods and the UN REDD encourages FPIC – Free Prior Informed Consent to minimize overall damage. An overview of steps to implement REDD+ in villages are as following: Communities have the choice to accept or reject and ask questions, then land use planning and the most integral step is when payments are introduced based on individual dividend – each village may chose if this money goes to community projects (because individually the amount may not be big). Land use planning results in draft proposals about boundaries in the village, land-use plans and bylaws for forests. Bylaws typically restricted timber and charcoal processing. TFCG/MJUMITA is establishes REDD+ project without waiting for approval from national authorities in order to be within the set timeframe. The payments total to villages mimicked a performance-based system – carbon stored based on an estimation of REDD + size forests and village performance on bylaws. The money for these payments comes from project funds, but TFCG and MJUMITA uses carbon market price when paying to plan for the future finances that will be from the market. The average trial payment per household in five villages was about USD $14, less than 2% annual household income. AnalysisREDD+ changes governance of land and resources, which could be criticised as ‘steering’. Such that actors and institutional structures influence resource access and facilitation of interaction. Changing structures to legitimize tradable carbon is challenging and demanding there are many who may be directly affected and involved. Typically in Tanzania local people have limited capabilities for use rights to forests and is subject to conflicts. At the end of REDD+ pilot project villages chosen received land certificates as a result of land use planning. TFCG/MJUMITA offered help to improve livelihoods of locals through activity groups that generate income and prevent leakage, however the outreach was low and comes with a fee. Regarding the introduction of payments for reduced deforestation and emissions, the system of trial payments only lasted a while. Distribution is different in each village and so were the outcomes monetarily. The TFCG proposed undifferentiated payment for eligible inhabitants even though some are at risk of higher opportunity cost. Most allocates them to village leaders, for community projects. However this could be risking the facilitation of corruption. Limits were set to payments. For example there is a maximum amount of how much each family can be compensated.ConclusionYes, this case constitutes for green grabbing. The processes of input and output legitimization in REDD+ pilot project Kilosa have been accepted positively by 70% of data gathered, but those forced to relocate were not included in the data (1.7% of households). Minority groups complain about having no voice, and communities may have little to no influence on payment systems. Sometimes payments are handed to local forest conservation groups where villagers have lack of trust to village leaders or if they are disorganized. Livelihoods have to change because of their obligation towards saving nature and the environment, through carbon sales and REDD+. The payment set up was a temporary program. Adding to the argument that this project accounts for green grabbing, it allows legal methods of forcing people out of their homes for environmental means.